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ABSTRACT 
We generalize the Bayes' theorem within the transferable belief model framework. The 
generalized Bayesian theorem (GBT) allows us to compute the belief over a space 6) 
given an obsemation x c_ X when one knows only the beliefs over X for every 0 i ~ 6). 
We also discuss the disjunctive rule of combination (DRC) for distinct pieces of 
evidence. This rule allows us to compute the belief over X from the beliefs induced by 
two distinct pieces of evidence when one knows only that one of the p&ces of evidence 
holds. The properties of the DRC and GBT and their uses for belief propagation in 
directed belief networks are analyzed. The use of the discounting factors is justified. The 
application of these rules is illustrated by an example of medical diagnosis. 
KEYWORDS: belief unctions, Bayes' theorem, disjunctive rule of  combina- 
tion. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents the disjunctive rule of combination (DRC) and the 
generalized Bayesian theorem (GBT) within the framework of the trans- 
ferable belief model, a model for quantifying beliefs using belief functions. 
Their use is illustrated by a typical application in the domain of the 
medical diagnostic process. 
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Suppose bell: 2 a ~ [0, 1] is a belief function induced on the frame of 
discernment 1~ by a piece of evidence E 1. Suppose bel2:2 ~ ~ [0, 1] is a 
belief function induced on the same frame of discernment f~ by another 
piece of evidence E 2. Suppose E~ and E 2 are distinct pieces of evidence 
(Sharer [1], Smets [2], Smets [3]). Shafer introduced Dempster's rule of 
combination to compute: 
be l l2  = bel 1 • bel 2 
where bell2 is the belief function induced on l~ by the conjunction "E  1 
and E2." 
We present a combination rule, the DRC, that permits the derivation of 
the belief function induced on ~ by the disjunction of two pieces of 
evidence. It corresponds to a situation where you could assess your belief 
on 12 if E 1 were true, your belief on ~ if E 2 were true, but you only know 
that the disjunction "E  1 or E2" is true. 
As an example of an application of the DRC, consider the medical 
diagnosis process. Let X be the domain of symptoms, each x in X being a 
particular symptom. Let 19 be the domain of diseases, each 0 i in O being a 
particular disease. The diseases 0 i are so defined that they are mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive. Suppose we have assessed our belief over the 
symptoms for every disease 0 i and we want to assess our belief over the 
symptoms knowing only that the patient has either disease 01 or disease 
02. This is the case when it is known that all the diseases excepting 01 and 
02 can be excluded. The DRC provides the solution when the a priori 
belief over 01 and 02 is vacuous. Its extension to the case where there is a 
non-vacuous a priori over 01 and 02 can also be obtained. 
Simultaneously with the DRC, we derive the GBT. Bayes' theorem is 
central for probabilistic inference. In the medical diagnostic process con- 
sidered, let P(xl Oi) be the probability of the symptoms given each diagnos- 
tic 0 i • O, and let our a priori belief over 19 be quantified by the 
probability distribution function P0. After observing the symptom x c_ X, 
the probability distribution on 19 is updated into P(Oilx), the a posteriori 
probability distribution on O, by the application of Bayes' theorem: 
P(xlOi)Po(Oi) 
P(O~lx) = ~.,p(xlOi)Po(Oj) VO~ • 19 
J 
In other words, from the probability over X given each 0 i • 19 (and the 
a priori probability on O), Bayes' theorem allows us to derive the probabil- 
ity over 19 given any x _ X. 
The GBT is a generalization of Bayes' theorem where all conditional 
probabilities are replaced by belief functions and the a priori belief 
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function on 6) is vacuous. A further generalization for non-vacuous a priori 
belief on 19 is also presented. 
The use of the GBT for medical diagnosis resolves the problem of how 
to select uncommitted a priori probabilities on 19 that can represent the 
absence of any a priori commitment towards any disease. The vacuous 
belief that characterizes a state of total ignorance is used on the disease 
space 19. Such a state of ignorance cannot be represented within probabil- 
ity theory; indeed total ignorance means that any strict subset of the 
disease set 6) should receive the same degree of belief. No probability 
function can describe such a belief state once 119[ > 2, as the same 
probability should be given to every 0i, but also to every 0i u 0i... (any 
strict subset of 6)). 
1.1. Belief Propagation in Directed Networks 
Belief networks described by Shafer et al. [4] are undirected hyper-graphs. 
Hyper-nodes represent sets of variables (e.g., the symptoms and the 
diseases) and hyper-edges are weighted with belief functions defined on 
the product space of the variables represented by the nodes attached to 
the hyper-edges. In Pearl's approach (Pearl [5])--concerning only proba- 
bility functions--the dges are directed and weighted by the conditional 
probabilities over (the variables represented by) the child node given (the 
variables represented by) the parent nodes. 
In this paper, we provide the tools necessary to use belief functions 
(instead of probability functions) in directed graphs similar to those 
considered by Pearl. An edge between a parent node O and a child node 
X will be weighted by conditional belief functions over X for each value 0g 
of O. Our approach is less general than Shafer's, but we feel that in 
practice the loss of generality is not important. Indeed we agree with Pearl 
[5] who argues that it is more "natural" and "easier" to assess conditional 
probabilities (and conditional beliefs) over X given 0,. than the joint 
probabilities (and beliefs) over the space Xx®, and that in most real life 
cases only conditional beliefs will be collected. 
The DRC can be used for forward propagation in directed networks. 
Consider two parent nodes, t9 and ~, of node X and the conditional belief 
functions belx(. lO i) and belx(.I ~) on X given each Oi ~ 6) and given each 
t0i ~ ~. The conjunctive rule of combination provides the belief function 
on X given "0 i and ~." The disjunctive rule of combination provides the 
belief function on X given "0 i or ~." 
The GBT can be used for backward propagation of beliefs in directed 
networks between a child node X and its parent node 19. Given the 
conditional belief over X given each 0 i E 19, the GBT computes the belief 
induced on 19 for any x _c X. 
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1.2. Content 
In section 2, we define the principle of minimal commitment, the 
generalized likelihood principle, and the concept of conditional cognitive 
independence. The first formalizes the idea that one should never give 
more belief to something than is justified. The second formalizes the idea 
that the belief induced by a disjunction of several pieces of evidence is a 
function of the beliefs induced by each piece of evidence. The third 
extends the idea of stochastic independence to belief functions. 
In section 3, we derive the DRC and the GBT. In section 4, we show 
that they can also be derived through constructive approaches based on 
the principle of minimal commitment. In section 5, we present some 
properties of the GBT and some of its limitations. We show in particular 
that the GBT becomes the classical Bayes' theorem when all the belief 
functions happen to be probability functions. In section 6, we present he 
use of the DRC and the GBT for the propagation of beliefs in directed 
belief networks. In section 7, we present an example of the use of the DRC 
and GBT for a medical diagnosis problem. In section 8, we summarize the 
major results and conclude. 
1.3. Historical Notes 
Smets [6] derived initially both the DRC and the GBT by the technique 
presented in section 4. Most theorems described here are proved in Smets 
[6]. The GBT was also presented in Smets [2, 7, 8], discussed at full length 
in Shafer [9]. The DRC was presented in Moral [10], Dubois and Prade 
[11], [12], Smets [2], and Cohen et al. [13]. The present paper not only 
details both rules and many of their properties, but it also provides 
normative requirements hat justify them. 
2. BELIEF FUNCTIONS 
We present some necessary material concerning belief functions and 
proceed to expound the following three principles: the principle of mini- 
mal commitment, he generalized likelihood principle, and the conditional 
cognitive independence. Belief functions are used to quantify someone's 
beliefs. They cover the same domain as subjective probabilities, but do not 
use the additivity axiom required for probability measures. The existence 
of "basic belief masses" (bbm) allocated to subsets of a frame of discern- 
ment fl is postulated. For A c_ 1~, the bbm m(A) quantifies the portion of 
belief that supports A without supporting any strict subset of A, and that 
could be transferred to subsets of A if further information justifies it. This 
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model is at the core of the transferable belief model, our interpretation of
Dempster-Shafer theory (Smets [2, 14], Smets and Kennes [15], Smets 
[16]). Our results can be easily transferred to other interpretations of 
Dempster-Shafer theory, like the hints theory (Kohlas and Monney [17]) 
or the context model (Gebhardt and Kruse [18]). 
2.1. Background 
Let fl be a finite non empty set called the frame of discernment. The 
mapping bel: 2 n ~ [0, 1] is an (unnormalized) belief function iff there 
exists a set of basic belief assignment (bba) m: 2 n --* [0, 1] such that: 
m(A)  = 1 
A c~l 
and 
bel(A) = ~ m(B). 
BcA,B~O 
(Note that bel(Q) = 0.) 
The values of m(A) for A in ~ are called the basic belief masses (bbm). 
m(Q) may be positive; when m(Q) = 0 (hence bel(fD = 1), bel is called a 
normalized belief function. In Shafer's presentation, he asserts that m(O) = 
0, or equivalently that bel(O) = 1, and consequently, belief combination 
and conditioning are normalized by dividing the results by appropriate 
scaling factors. The difference between Shafer's definition and ours was 
introduced when we considered the difference between the open-world and 
closed-world assumptions (Smets [2]). The nature of m(Q)> 0 is fully 
discussed in Smets [19]. 
Our presentation is developed under the open-world assumption, as 
described in the transferable belief model. However the whole presenta- 
tion is still valid under the more restrictive assumption of a closed-world. 
Belief functions are in one-to-one correspondence with plausibility 
functions pl: 2 n ~ [0, 1] and commonality functions q: 2 a -~ [0, 1] where 
for all A c_ fI, A 4~ Q, 
pl(A) = bel(l/) - bel(/T) and pl(~) = 0 
q(A)= ~ m(B) and q(O)=l  
AcB 
where A-is the complement of A relative to fL 
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A vacuous belief function is a normalized belief function such that 
bel(A) -- 0 VA 4= fl. It quantifies our belief in a state of total ignorance as 
no strict subset of II receives any support. 
Suppose bel quantifies our belief about the frame of discernment 12 and 
we learn that A __ lq is false. The resulting conditional belief function 
bel(.iA) is obtained through the unnormalized rule of conditioning (see 
remark 1 for the use of if or the unnormalized conditioning), bel(BiA) can 
be read as the (degree of) belief of B given A or the belief of B in a 
context where A holds): 
m(BiA)= ~ m(BUX)  if BeAt12  
xcX 
= 0 otherwise 
bel(BiA) = bel(B U A) - bel(A) VB __ II 
pl(BiA) = pl(A n B) VB ~ D, (2.1) 
The origin of this relation is to be found in the nature of the transferable 
belief model itself. A mass m(B) given to B is transferred by conditioning 
on A to A n B. Other justifications can also be advanced, bel(.iA) is the 
i 
minimal commitment specialization of bel, such that pl(AIA) = 0 (Klawonn 
and Smets [20]). It can also be derived as the minimal commitment 
solution where bel("BI A") is considered to be the belief in the conditional 
object "BIA" (Nguyen and Smets [21]). Note that these derivations are 
obtained without ever considering the concept of "combination of distinct 
pieces of evidence," hence without requiring any definition of the notions 
of distinctness, combination, and probability). 
Consider two belief functions bel 1 and bel 2 induced by two distinct 
pieces of evidence on 1). The belief function bell2 that quantifies the 
combined impact of the two pieces of evidence is obtained through the 
conjunctive rule of combination: bell2 = bel 1C)belz where C) represents 
the conjunctive combination operator. Its computation is based on the 
basic belief assignment m~2: 
VA c 12 mlz(A) = ~ ma(B)mz(C) (2.2) 
BnC=A 
Expressed with the commonality functions, it becomes: 
q12(A) = ql(A)q2(A) 
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It can also be represented as: (Dubois and Prade [22] proved the relation 
for m,2.) 
m,2(A) = y' ml(AiB)m2(B) 
B c_,Q 
bell2(A) = ~ bell(AiB)m2(B) 
B c~l 
pll2(A) = y" pll(AiB)m2(B ) 
Bc_~ 
ql2(A) = ~ ql(AIB)m2(B) (2.3) 
BCtI 
Note that no normalization factor appears in these rules. 
REMARK 1: DEFINITIONS AND SYMBOLS Almost all authors working 
with belief functions consider only normalized belief functions, whereas we 
consider mainly unnormalized belief functions. In order to avoid confu- 
sion, we propose to keep the names of Dempster's rule of conditioning and 
Dempster's rule of combination for the normalized forms of conditioning 
and conjunctive combination, as was introduced by Sharer [1]. For the 
unnormalized rules, we propose to use the names of unnormalized rule of 
conditioning for 2.1, conjunctive rule of combination for 2.2, and disjunc- 
tive rule of combination for the rule introduced in section 3. 
We also propose to use the following symbols to represent hese 
operations. 
Dempster's rule of conditioning: 
unnormalized rule of conditioning: 
Dempster's rule of combination: 
conjunctive rule of combination: 
disjunctive rule of combination: 
I bel(AlB) 
: bel(AiB) 
• bell2 = bel 1 • bel 2 
C) bell2 = bellC)bel2 
C) bel,2 = bellC)belz 
The difference between the elements of the two pairs (I, i) and (~,  @)  
results only from the normalization factors applied in ] and ~. C) does 
not have a specific counterpart in Shafer's presentation (indeed once bel~ 
and bel2 are normalized, bell( ~ bel 2 is also normalized). Note that bel(.!B) 
could be a normalized belief function. In fact i is a generalization of I. 
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REMARK 2: NOTATION Given two spaces 19 and X, we write belx(.10) 
and plx(. I0) to represent the belief and plausibility functions induced on 
space X in a context where 0_  O is the case, and belxxo,plxx o to 
represent belief and plausibility functions on the space XxO. We write 
x n 0 as a shorthand for the intersection of the cylindrical extensions of 
x _ X and 0 _ 19 over the product space Xx19 (i.e., x n 0 means cyl(x) n 
cyl(0)). Similarly x u 0 means cyl(x) u cyl(0)...  
Subscripts of bel and pl represent their domain and are omitted when 
there is no ambiguity as in bel(xiO),bel(O),.... 
REMARK 3: Our notation will not distinguish between elements like 0 i 
where 0i ~ O and their corresponding singleton {0i} ~ O. The context 
should always make clear which is intended, and the notation is seriously 
lightened. 
The following lemmas will be useful: 
LEMMA 1: I f  pl: 2 ~ --* [0, 1] is a plausibility function, then the correspond- 
ing commonality function q is q( A ) = ~" B ~ A( -- 1) IBI+ l P l( B )" 
Proof immediate by replacing bel(B) by pl(fD - pl(B) in the relation 
between q and bel given in Shafer [1, p. 41]. QED 
LEMMA 2: Vx c X, VO c_ t9, VO i ~ O: pl(xiO) >__ pl(xiO~). 
Proof Let cyl(x) and cyl(0) be the cylindrical extensions of x and 0 on 
the space Xx19. Then plx(xiO)= plxxo(cyl(x)icyl(O))= plxxo(cyl(x)n 
cyl(0)) > plxxo(cyl(x) n cyl(0k)) = Plx(XiO k) where 0 h ~ 0. QED 
2.2. The Principle of Minimal Commitment 
We introduce the principle of minimal commitment. Given a belief 
function derived on 1~, this principle induces the construction of new 
belief functions: 1) on refined spaces g~' where every element of II is split 
into several elements of II' and 2) on extended spaces gl", where if '  
contains all the elements of l l  and some new elements. These two 
processes are called the vacuous extension and the ballooning extension, 
respectively. In this paper, the vacuous extension transforms a belief 
function over O into a belief function over XxO and the ballooning 
extension transforms a conditional belief function belx(. I0 i) defined on X 
for 0 i ~ 0 into a new belief function over XxO. 
In order to understand the principle of minimal commitment, we must 
consider the meaning of bel(A) and pl(A). Within the transferable belief 
model, the degree of belief bel(A) given to a subset A quantifies the 
amount of justified specific support to be given to A, and the degree of 
Belief Functions 9 
plausibility pl(A) given to a subset A quantifies the maximum amount of 
potential specific support hat could be given to A. 
bel(A) = ~ m(X) pl(A) = Y'. m(X) = bel(tl) - bel(A-). 
G~Xc_II AnX~O 
We say specific because m(Q) is neither included in bel(A) nor in pl(A). 
The bbm's m(X) included in bel(A) are only those given to the subsets of 
A that are not subsets of A. m(~3) is not included because ~3 is a subset of 
both A and z~ 
We say justified because we include in bel(A) only the bbm's given to 
subsets of A. For instance, consider two distinct elements x and y of 1-1. 
The bbm m({x, y}) given to {x, y} could support x if further information 
indicates this. However given the available information the bbm can only 
be given to {x, y}. 
We say potential because the bbm included in pl(A) could be trans- 
ferred to non-empty subsets of A if some new information could justify 
such a transfer. It would be the case if we learn that A is  impossible. After 
conditioning on A, note that bel(AIA) = pl(A). Large plausibilities given 
to all subsets reflect the lack of commitment of our belief; we are ready to 
give a large belief to any subset. 
Consider now the case where there is ambiguity about the amount of 
plausibility that should be given to the subsets of 11. The ambiguity could 
be resolved by giving the largest possible plausibility to every subsets. 
The principle of minimal commitment formalizes this idea: one should 
never give more support than justified to any subset of 11. It satisfies a 
form of skepticism, noncommitment, or conservatism in the allocation of 
belief. In spirit, it is not far from what probabilists attempt to achieve with 
the maximum entropy principle. The concept of commitment was already 
introduced to create an ordering on the set of belief functions defined on a 
frame of discernment 11 (see Moral [10], Yager [23], Dubois and Prade [11, 
24], Delgado and Moral [25], Kruse and Schwecke [26], Hsia [27]. 
To define the principle, let pl 1 and pl 2 be two plausibility functions on 
such that: 
ply(A) < pl2(A) VA __ 1-1. (2.4) 
We say that pl 2 is no more committed than pl I (and less committed if there 
is at least one strict inequality). The same qualification is extended to the 
related bba and belief functions. The least committed belief function is the 
vacuous belief function (m(l l)  = 1). The most committed belief function is 
the contradictory belief function (m(Q) = 1). 
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The principle of minimal commitment indicates that, given two equally 
supported beliefs, only one of which can apply, the most appropriate is the 
least committed. 
For unnormalized belief functions, the principle is based on the plausi- 
bility function. The inequalities 2.4 expressed in terms of belief functions 
become: 
bel l (A) + ml(Q) > bel2(A) + m2(•) VA ___ f~. (2.5) 
To define the principle by requiring that: 
bel l(A) > bel2(A) VA _ 12 (2.6) 
is inappropriate as seen in the following example. Let: 
bel l(A) = 0VA ~ 12, and bel l (O) = .7 
If bel2 is a vacuous belief function, it is less committed than bell. It is not 
the case that bel2(A) < bell(A) VA _ IL However, one has pll(A) = .7 
_< pl2(A) = 1 Vii ___ f~ as required. 
Under the closed-world assumption, the principle can be similarly de- 
fined with plausibility inequalities 2.4 or belief function inequalities 2.6. 
The last definition is historically the oldest. This explains why we maintain 
the "minimal commitment" name even though it could be argued that the 
principle would be better named the principle of "maximal plausibility" or 
"maximal skepticism." 
The principle of minimal commitment is not used to derive the DRC 
and the GBT in section 3. However during the constructive derivations of 
the GBT in section 4, we will encounter plausibility functions pl whose 
values are known only for a set ~-of  subsets of 12. In most cases, one can 
build a plausibility function pl* such that pl*(A) = pl(A) VA ~ 5rand pl* 
is nevertheless known everywhere on 12. This is achieved by committing 
the largest possible plausibility to every subset of ~ that is not an element 
of ~. This application of the principle of minimal commitment is trans- 
lated into the following property. 
THE PRINCIPLE OF MINIMAL COMMITMENT FOR PARTIALLY DE- 
FINED PLAUSIBILITY FUNCTIONS 
Let 3 r be a set of subsets of a frame of discernment 12, and let pl be a 
plausibility function whose value is known only for those subsets of 12 in 
5(. Let ~ be the set of all the plausibility functions pl' on f~ such that 
pl'(A) = pl(A) for all A in ~.. The maximal element pl* of ~ ,  when it 
exists, is the plausibility function pl* such that Vpl' in .~: pl*(B) > pl'(B) 
VB cF~. 
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Two special cases of the principle will be used here: the vacuous 
extension and the"ballooning" extension. 
1. Let f~ be a frame of discernment and let pl be defined for every 
subset of fL Let f~' be a refinement: R of fl. The plausibility 
function pl' on ~' induced by pl that satisfies the principle of minimal 
commitment is the vacuous extension of pl on f~ via R. Its bbms are 
defined as follows (Shafer [1, p. 146] et seq.). Let m and m' be the 
bba underlying pl and pl'. Then m'(R(A))= m(A), VA _c ~), and 
m'(B) = 0 otherwise. 
2. Let O and X be two finite spaces, belx(.i0) be a conditional belief 
function on X given some 0 ~ ® and ~'el* be the set of belief 
functions belxxo over space XxO such that their conditioning iven 0 
is equal to belx(, i0). The element of ~el*  that satisfies the principle 
of minimal commitment is the belief function bel*v~e such that: 
bel~v~e((cyl(x) n cyl(0)) u cyl(0)) - bel~cxo(cyl(0)) = belx(xiO) 
where cyl(x) and cyl(0) are the cylindrical extensions of x and 0 on 
the space XxO, and bel*vxo(cyl(0)) = M~(~30) 
It can be informally rewritten as: 
be l~o(x  u 0) = belx(xiO) + Mx(Q!O) 
We call this transformation between bel and bel* the deconditionalization 
process (Smets [6]). bel* is called the "ballooning extension" of bel(xi0) 
on XxO as each mass m(xiO) is given after deconditionalization to the 
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Figure 1. Ballooning of the bbm m(x 2 U x3i02) (dark area) onto XxO (shaded 
area). The white dots correspond to the 16 elements of XxO. 
2 The mapping R from ~ to ~'  is a refinement if every element of ~2 is mapped by R into 
one or more elements of fl' and the images R(to) of the elements to of f~ under the 
refinement R partition ~' .  
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largest subset of Xx® so that its intersection with cyl(0) is the set 
cyl(x) • cyl(0) (Shafer [9]) called bel* the "conditional embedding" of 
bel(xi0)). (Note the similarity between this ballooning extension and the 
passage from a conjunction cyl(x)n cyl(0) to a material implication 
cTl(x) - ,  cyl(0).) 
2.3. Conditional Cognitive Independence 
In our derivation of the GBT and the DRC, we need to determine the 
belief induced by two "independent" observations given the belief induced 
by each observation. The concept of "independence" is defined as follows. 
Let X and Y be two spaces from which we collect observations (pieces of 
evidence). The two variables X and Y are said to be "independent" if the 
knowledge of the particular value taken by one of them does not change our 
belief about he value that the second could take, i.e., bel x (AIy) = bel x ( A E Y' ) 
VA c_X, Vy, y '~  Y, y ~y'  and bely(Bix)= belv(Bix') VB c_ Y, Vx, 
X r ~ X ,  x ~ x ' .  
We use this concept of independent observations in order to derive the 
DRC and the GBT as we claim that two independent observations induce 
two belief functions that can be combined by the conjunctive rule of 
combination. More specifically, suppose a set @ = {0i: i = 1...n} of 
contexts 0 i. Suppose we collect two observations that are independent 
whatever the context 0 i. Such two observations are said to be conditionally 
independent. Each observation i duces a belief on (9 and constitutes thus 
a piece of evidence relative to (9. We claim that two observations that are 
conditionally independent constitute two pieces of evidence relative to (9 
that are distinct. The satisfaction of that claim was often asked for--it 
motivated the development of the GBT in Smets [6]--and authors com- 
plain of its non-satisfaction by other attempts to define an equivalent of 
the GBT (e.g., see Halpern and Fagin [28]). 
Once that claim is admitted, the properties underlying the concept of 
cognitive independence, detailed here below, are deduced as a spin-off of 
the DRC. But in fact the concept of independent observations i  already 
sufficient to deduce the properties underlying the concept of cognitive 
independence within the TBM, therefore without regard to the DRC and 
the GBT. 
In the transferable belief model framework, the concept of two indepen- 
dent variables X and Y translates as follows: the ratio of the plausibilities 
on X should not depend on y _ Y: 
plx(Xliy) plx(xl) 
plx(x2[Y ) Plx(x2 ) Vx 1, x 2 ~ X, Vy _ Y. (2.7) 
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As plx(xiy) -- plxxv(X • y), the independence r quirement becomes: 
plxxv(x 1 ny)  plx(x ~) 
= - -  Vx l ,x  2 c X,  Vy c_ Y. 
plxxr(X 2 n y) plx(x 2) 
These ratio constraints imply that (the proof is given under lemma 3 in the 
appendix): 
plxxv(x ~ y) = p lx (x )p ly (y )  Vx c_ X, Vy ~ Y. (2.8) 
Two variables (X and Y) that satisfy this requirement are said to satisfy 
the cognitive independence property. This definition was introduced in 
Shafer [1, p. 150]. It extends the classical stochastic independence. 
The cognitive independence oncept can be extended in a straightfor- 
ward manner when the plausibility functions are conditional plausibility 
functions. If the two variables X and Y are independent in each context 
0i, for all 0g ~ ®, then they satisfy the conditional cognitive independence 
(CCI) property if: 
plx~v(x A YiOi) = plx(xiOi)ply(yiO i) Vx c_ X, Vy c_ Y, V0 i ~ 6) 
(2.9) 
The previous independence d finitions are based on plausibility functions. 
They could have been based as well on belief functions. Two variables X 
and Y are CCI iff the ratio of their belief functions atisfy the dual of (2.7) 
belx(x l ly)  belx (~- 1 ) 
- Vx~,x 2 ~_ X, Vy c Y. (2.10) 
belx(x2iy) belx(Tr 2 ) 
In fact, both definitions are equivalent as (2.7) is equivalent to (2.10). A 
proof is given in the appendix (see lemma 4). 
2.4. The Generalized Likelihood Principle 
In order to derive the DRC and the GBT, we need to generalize the 
likelihood principle within the transferable belief model. It simply postu- 
lates that the belief function induced by the disjunction of two pieces of 
evidence is only a function of the belief functions induced by each piece of 
evidence. We will build plx(.E0) on X for any subset 0 of @, even though 
we only know the conditional plausibility functions plx(.i0 i) over X, V0 i e 
6). 
To help in understanding the principle, we present the likelihood 
principle as described in probability theory. The likelihood l(Oilx) (some- 
times called the relative plausibility) of the "simple" hypothesis 0i, V0~ ~ @, 
given the data x _ X is defined as being equal to the conditional probabil- 
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ity p(x[O i) of the data x given the simple hypothesis 0i (Edwards [29]) 
l(0ilx) -- p(xl0i) 
The likelihood of the disjunction 0_  19 of several simple hypotheses 
0i, i = 1, 2.. .  k where 0 = {01 u 0 z u ... U 0 h} is defined as a function of 
the likelihoods of the simple hypothesis 0g ~ 0: 
1(0Ix) = f ({ l (O i lx ) :  0 i ~. 0}) 
where f is the maximum operator ( f (a ,  b ... .  ) = max(a, b,. . .  )). The link 
between the likelihood functions extended to disjunction of hypothesis and 
possibility functions (Zadeh [30], Dubois and Prade [31]) was shown in 
Smets [32]. 
A form of this principle was already proposed in Sharer [1, p. 239] when 
he studied statistical inference in the context of belief functions. He 
proposed to define pl(0 Ix) = max0, ~ 0 pl(0ilx). This solution is not satisfac- 
tory for statistical inference, as it does not satisfy Requirement R1 in 
section 3, a requirement for which satisfaction is often asked (Smets [6], 
Halpern and Fagin [28]). 
The likelihood principle is defined for probability functions. We broaden 
it into the generalized likelihood principle applicable to plausibility func- 
tion within the transferable belief model: 
V0 ___ 19, Vx ___ X, pl(x!0) depends only on {pl(xiOi),pl(YciOi): 0 i ~ 0}. 
The maximum operator is not assumed. The need of both pl(x[O i) and 
pl(~i0~) reflects the non-additivity of the plausibility functions. 
The origin of the principle can be justified by requiring that: 
1. pl(xi0) is the same after the frame X has been transformed by 
coarsening into the frame with only two elements: x and $. This 
explains why only those values of pl(. I 0 i) for x and $ are used. 
2. the values of pl(xi0j) for 0 r e 0 are irrelevant to the values of 
pl(xi0). Hence only the 0 i ~ 0 are used. 
3. THE DISJUNCTIVE RULE OF COMBINATION AND THE 
GENERALIZED BAYESIAN THEOREM 
We proceed with the derivation of the DRC and the GBT. Let X and O 
be two finite non-empty sets. Suppose all we know about X is represented 
initially by the set {belx(.iOi): 0 i ~ ®} of belief functions belx(. iO i) on X. 
We only know the beliefs on X when we know which element of 19 holds. 
We do not know these beliefs on X when we only know that the prevailing 
element of t9 belongs to a given subset 0 of 19. The DRC permits to build 
the belief function belx(.]0) on X for any 0 c_ 19. 
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Simultaneously we derive the GBT that permits to build belo(.ix) for 
any x _X  from the conditional belief functions belx(.10i), as the DRC 
and the GBT are linked through the relation: 
plx(x iO)  = plo(0!x), V0 _c ®, Vx ___ X. 
The derivation of the DRC and the GBT is based on the following ideas. 
Let X and Y be two frames of discernment. For each 0i ~ O, let 
belx(.i0 i) quantify our belief on X given 0i, and bely(.iO i) quantify our 
belief on Y given 0g. 0 i can be interpreted as a context. We assume there is 
no other knowledge about X and Y except these conditional belief 
functions on X and Y known for each 0 i ~ O. It implies among others 
that we do not have any a priori belief on O, i.e., we have the vacuous 
a priori belief function bel 0 on O (this condition will be relaxed in section 
5). 
Suppose we learn then that x 0 ~ X holds. What is the belief function 
belo(.ix 0) on O induced by the knowledge of the conditional belief 
functions belx(.iO i) VO i ~ 0 and of the fact that x 0 holds? As we assume 
that every state of knowledge induces a unique belief on any variable, the 
belief function belo(.ix 0) on O exists and is unique. Hence belo(.ix 0) is a 
function F of x 0 and the belx(.10 i) for 0 i ~ ®: 
belo(.ix .) = F(xo,{belx(. iOi) :  0 i e ®}) 
Similarly if we learn that Y0 --- Y holds, the belief function belo(.!y 0) on O 
is a function F of Y0 and the bely(.iO i) for 0 i c O: 
belo(.iyo) = F(yo,  {belr(.!0i): 0 i E O}) 
Finally, if we learn that the joint observation (xo, Yo) c XxY, x o c_ X,  
Yo ~ Y, is the case, we could build the belief function beio(.ix0, Yo) on O 
based on (x o, Yo) if we knew the conditional belief functions belxxY(.iO i) 
for 0i ~ O: 
belo(-ix0, Y0) = F( (xo ,  Y0), {belxxY(.10i): 0i ~ ®}) 
Suppose the observations x 0 __c_ X and Y0 - Y are conditionally indepen- 
dent whatever context 0~ c O holds. The conditional independence of X 
and Y implies that the observations x 0 and Y0 are two distinct pieces of 
evidence relative to O. Each piece of evidence induces a belief on O: 
belo(.ix o) and belo(.iyo). The belief belo(.ix o, Yo) that x o and Y0 jointly 
induce on O can be obtained by the conjunctive rule of combination: 
belo(.ix0, Yo) = belo(.ix0)C)belo(.iYo). 
In Requirement R, we ask that the belief function belo(.!x o, Yo) induced 
on ® by two pieces of evidence x o and Yo that correspond to two 
independent observations x o _c X and Y0 --- Y is the same as the belief 
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function belo(.ix0)C)belo(.!y 0) on ® computed by the conjunctive combi- 
nation of the individual belief functions bele(.]x 0) and belo(.iy0). We also 




three frames of discernment X, Y and O. 
our knowledge on X, Y and t9 is represented by belx(.i0 ) and 
belv(.iO i) VO i ~ O. 
X and Y are conditionally independent given 0 i, VOi ~ t9 
Vx _ X and Vy c Y, there is a function F such that 
belo(.ix) - -F(x,  {belx(.iOi): 0 i ~ 0}) 
belo(.iy) -= F(y ,  {bely(.iOi): 0 i ~ @}) 
belo(.ix, y) = F( (x ,  y) ,  {belxxr(.iOi): 0 i c 19}) 
Then: 
Requirement RI: 
bele(.ix, y) = belo( . ix)Qbelo( . iy)  
Requirement R2: 
plx(x iO)  = g({Plx(x iOi) ,p lx(210i) :  0i ~ 0}) 
plr(yi0) = g({plr(YiOi) ,p lr(YiOi) :  0 i ~ 0}) 
plxxr(wiO)  = g({Plxxr(wiOi) ,p lxxr(~iOi) :  0 i c 0}) 
VxGX,  VOGO 
Vy___Y, V0 _O 
Vw G XxY, VO c O. 
The functions F and g will be deduced from Requirement R in Theorems 
1 to 4. This allows us to build: 
1. belx(.E0) and belv(.10), 0 __ O, (the DRC) 
2. belo(.ix) and belo(.iy), (the GBT) and 
3. belxxY(.iO), 0 G O, (the CCI), 
from the set of conditional belief functions belx(.iOi), and belr(.]Oi), 
0i~O.  
The derivation of the DRC and the GBT are presented successively, first 
when the belief functions belx(.10i), and bely(.10i), 0 i ~ 6) are normalized 
(i.e., belx(X]O i) = 1 and bely(YIO i) = 1), then when they are not. The 
CCI is a by-product of the DRC derivation. All proofs are given in the 
appendix. We present only the formulas for belx(. 10), 0 G ® and belo(.ix), 
x _ X, (and their related pl, m and q functions). The same formulas can be 
written for bely(.10), 0 ___ O and belo(.iy) , y ___ Y. 
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THEOREM 1. THE DISJUNCTIVE RULE OF COMBINATION, normalized be- 
liefs. Given the Requirement R and its antecedents. Given belx(XlO i) = 1 
and belv(YlO i) = 1, VO i ~ O. Then VO c_ O, Vx c X; 
belx(xlO) = belx(xiO) = l--I belx(xlOi) (3.1) 
Oi~ 0 
plx(xlO) = plx(xiO) = 1 - I--I (1 - plx(xloi)) (3.2) 
Oi~ 0 
mx(x[O) = mx(x!O) = ~ 1--I mx(xiloi) (3.3) 
U i: oi~ oxi =x i: OiG 0 
The relation 3.3 shows the dual nature of the conjunctive and disjunctive 
rules of combination (Dubois and Prade [11]). Suppose two belief functions 
with their basic belief assignments mI and m 2 on 11. When combined, the 
product ml(A)m2(B) , A _c O, B __c_ O, is allocated to A n B in the con- 
junctive rule of combination, and to A U B in the disjunctive rule of 
combination. One has VC _c ~: 
1. conjunctive rule of combination (CRD) 
mlQm2(C)  = Y" ml(A)m2(B) 
AcqB=C 
q l~q2(C)  = ql(C)q2(C) 
2. disjunctive rule of combination (DRC) 
miQm2 (C)= E ml(A)m2 (B) 
AuB=C 
bell Gbe l2 (C)  = bell(C)bel2(C) 
The N and U operators encountered in the relations for the basic belief 
assignments explain the origin of the symbols (~) and Q.  These rela- 
tions shows also the dual role of bel and q. Indeed bel(C) is the sum of the 
basic belief masses given to the subsets of C and q(C) as the sum of the 
basic belief masses given to the supersets of C (beware of the comments 
after theorem 3). 
Once the DRC is known, the GBT is derived thanks to the rclation: 
plo(Oix) = plx(xiO) VO c_ O, Vx c_ X. 
as confirmed by the equality between 3.2 and 3.5. 
18 Philippe Smets 
where 
THEOREM 2. THE GENERALIZED BAYESIAN THEOREM, normalized be- 
liefs. Given the Requirement R and its antecedents. Given belx(XlO i) = 1 
and bely(YlO i) = 1, VO i ~ 19. Then VO c_ O, Vx c_ X; 
belo(Oix) = 1-I belx(210i) - 1-I belx(210i) (3.4) 
Oi~ "~ Oie 0 
belo(OIx) = K.belo(Oix) 
plo(0ix)  -- 1 - I-I (1 - plx(xlOi)) (3.5) 
0ie0 
plo(01x ) -- K.plo(Oix ) 
qo(Oi x) = I-I plx(x]oi) (3.6) 
oleo 
qo(Olx) = K.qo(Oix) 
g -1 = 1 - 1--I belx(YClOi) = 1 - l--I (1 - plx(xlO~)) 
Oi~ O Oi~ O 
As announced the CCI is derived as a by-product of the DRC. Note that 
3.2 and 3.5 are identical, reflecting the equality between plx(xiO) and 
plo(0!x). 
LEMMA 5. THE CONDITIONAL COGNITIVE INDEPENDENCE Under theorem 
1 conditions,: 
Plxxv(X A YiOi)) = plx(x!Oi)ply(yiO i) Vx C_ X,  Vy G Y, Oi ~ ®. 
We proceed with the derivation of the DRC and the GBT when the initial 
conditional belief functions are not normalized. Given a belief function 
bel: 2a~ [0, 1], we define a function b: 2n~ [0, 1] such that b(A)= 
bel(A) + m(Q). This b function is the real dual of the commonality 
function q. The real difference between theorems 1-2 and 3-4 concerns 
the computation of belx(xiO) and belo(01x). 
THEOREM 3. THE DISJUNCTIVE RULE OF COMBINATION, general case. 
Given the Requirement R and its antecedents. Then VO c O, Vx c X; 
bx(x!O) = F I  bx(xiOi) (3.7) 
belx(xiO) = bx(x!O) - bx(QiO) (3.8) 
plx(xiO) = 1 - I--I (1 - plx(xloi)) (3.9) 
0ie0 
mx(xiO) = ~ 1--[ mx(xilOi) (3.10) 
U i:oiEoXi= X i'. 0~0 
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The real dual of q is b, not bel: indeed in the disjunctive rule of 
combination one multiplies the b functions, not the bel functions, b(C) is 
the sum of the basic belief masses given to the subsets of C, including Q. 
Another way to see the dual nature of the DRC and CRC consists in 
building the "complementary" basic belief assignment ~: 2 a ~ [0, 1] of a 
basic belief assignment m: 2 n ~ [0, 1] with ~(A)  = m(..4) for every A _c fl. 
Then b(A) = q(A-) (Dubois and Prade [11]). 
THEOREM 4. THE GENERALIZED BAYESIAN THEOREM, general case. 
Given the Requirement R and its antecedents. Then VO c_ 19, Vx c_ X; 
bo(OEx) = ]-[ bx(.~iO~) 
OiE 
belo(0ix) = bo( Oix) - bo(Qix) (3.11) 
plo(01x) = 1 - 1-I (1 - plx(xiOi)) (3.12) 
0,~ 0 
qo(O[ x) = I-I plx(xiOi) (3.13) 
Oi~ 0 
4. CONSTRUCTIVE DERIVATIONS OF THEOREMS 3 AND 4 
(Smets [6]) 
In theorems 3 and 4 we derive the DRC and the GBT from general 
principles. These relations can also be obtained in a constructive way by 
the application of the principle of minimal commitment. We present hree 
different ways to derive both the DRC and the GBT. These constructions 
help in understanding the nature of the solutions. 
4.1. 
For each 0 i ~ O, build the ballooning extension bel~x o of belx(.i0 i) on 
XxO. Combine these belief functions bel(~xo by the conjunctive rule of 
= belxxoC)belxxoC). . .  C)belxxo be the re- combination. Let belxx o (1) (2) (n) 
suiting belief function on XxO. Let o) c_ Xx® and let xi be the projection 




1--I bx(xiiOi) - 
Oi~ 0 





oi ~ C) 
(all proofs are given in Smets [6, p. 163] et seq.) 
20 Philippe Smets 
The relations of Theorems 3 and 4 are obtained by conditioning belxx o 
on cyl(x) or cyl(0) and marginalizing the results on X or 19. 
Suppose the conditional belief functions belx(.I 0 i) are normalized for all 
0 i ~- 19, then any subset of Xx19 whose projection of 19 is not 19 itself 
receives a zero belief, i.e., the only knowledge of the normalized condi- 
tional belief functions belx(.I 0 i) induces a vacuous belief on ®. 
4.2. 
Results of theorems 3 and 4 can also be derived by individually consider- 
ing the ballooning extension bel~ of each conditional belief function 
belx(.iOi), i = 1,2. . .  n (n = 1191) on space Xx19. Then the beli are condi- 
tionated on x ___ X. The marginalization on 19 of the resulting conditional 
belief function is the (normalized) simple support function with basic 
belief masses 
m(-O~ix ) = be lx (2 iO i  ) + mx(Q!Oi )  
m(191x) = be lx (X iO  ~) - belx(~i0~) 
The conjunctive combination of these simple support functions on 19 
obtained for each 0 i ~ 19 are the relations 3.11 to 3.13. 
4.3. 
Finally one can also consider that each 0 i (i = 1, 2 . . .  n) is the value of a 
variable ®i that can take only two values: 0 i and 0 z. Given belx(, i0i), apply 
the principle of minimal commitment to build the belief function on the 
space XxO/ (i.e., build the ballooning extension). Then vacuously extend 
these belief functions obtained on each XxOi onto the space 
XxO1x®2x... x® n by again applying the principle of minimal commitment 
(i.e., build their vacuous extensions on XxO~x®zX... x®n). Combine all 
these belief functions on Xx191X®zX. . .  x® n by the conjunctive rule of 
combination and call the resulting belief function belxn. Let 19 be the 
space whose elements 7~ are the intersections (of the cylindrical exten- 
sions) of the complements of all 0~: v 4: i and Oi: SO T i = 01 ["1 02 . . .  ("1 
0~... ~ 0 n. Condition belxn on the space Xx19. The belief function in- 
duced on that space Xx® is the same as the one deduced in section 4.1. 
Note that the belief function bel x on X induced by the conditioning of 
belxn on 01 ~ 02 . . .  n 0 n is the belief function one would have derived by 
applying the conjunctive rule of combination to the individual conditional 
belief functions: bel x = belx(. !01)(~)belx(. i 02) Q . . .  (~)belx(. I On). 
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5. PROPERTIES OF GBT 
5.1. 
Assume there exists some a priori belief bel 0 over ® distinct from the 
belief induced by the set of conditional belief functions belx(, i0i), 0 i ~ (9. 
Combining bel 0 with the belief function induced on the space XxO leads 
to a generalization of the DRC. By (2.3) 
belx(x) = ~ mo(O)belx(xiO) (5.1) 
0 c_ i.) 
= Y', mo(O)( 1-I bx(xiOi)-  1--I bx(Qioi)} (5.2) 
0c_6) Oi~ 0 Oi~ 0 
plx(x) = ~ mo(O)plx(xiO) (5.3) 
OcO 
= ~ mo(O) (1 -  1--I (1--plx(xioi))   (5.4) 
O_cO 0,~0 
Proof The solution is obtained by @-combining the vacuous extension 
of bel 0 on XxO with belxx o and marginalizing them on X, using then 
belx(xiO) as given by equation 3.8. The full proof is given in Smets [6, p. 
178]. QED 
Equations 5.1 and 5.3 are particular cases of equation 2.3. They can be 
used to speed up computation of beliefs in beliefs networks. 
To obtain the belief function induced on ® given some x _c X, we 
@-combine bel 0 with the belief function deduced on O by the GBT. The 
results are the same as those obtained if we combine the vacuous exten- 
sion of bel 0 with the belief function belxx o induced on Xx® by the set of 
conditional belief functions belx(.i0i), 0 i ~ ® (see section 4.1) and then 
condition the result on x. (Proofs in Smets [6, p. 177]). 
5.2. 
Assume we have some belief belx0 on X. The GBT becomes 
belo(0) = ~ mxo(x)belo(O!x) 
xCX 
(5.5) 
where belo(0 ix) is given by equation 3.11. 
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Proof Build the vacuous extension of belx0 on Xx19, @-combine it 
with belxx o as derived in section 4.1. and marginalize the result on 
19. QED 
Note that equation 5.5 enables the backward propagation of belief based 
on doubtful observations. 
5.3. 
If each belx(.!0i) happens to be a probability function P(.10 i) on X then 
the GBT for 101 = 1 becomes: 
plo(01x) = P(x[O) Vx c_X 
That is, on the singletons 0 of 19, plo(.ix) reduces to the likelihood of 0 
given x. The analogy stops there as the solution for the likelihood of 
subsets of 19 are different (see section 2.4). 
If, furthermore, the a priori belief on 0 is also a probability function 
Po(O), then the normalized GBT becomes: 
belo(0lx ) = Z0,~ oe(xlOi)Po(Oi) = P(Olx) 
Eo, ~ oe(x l  oi) eo( Oi) 
i.e., the (normalized) GBT reduces itself into the classic Bayesian theorem, 
which explains the origin of its name. 
5.4. 
Assume belx(.10) is known not on each singleton of O, but on the 
elements of a partition of ®. Then redefine O by creating the coarsening 
O' of 19 such that the elements of O' are the elements of the partition of 
O and proceed as before on the space 19'. 
5.5. 
Assume belx(.10) is known on subsets of 19 which are not mutually 
exclusive. For instance assume one knows belx(.101) , belx(.102) and 
belx(.i 01 u 02). We must determine whether belx(.i 01 u 02) is compatible 
with the generalized likelihood principle (accepting some a priori belief on 
O) i.e., does there exist some a priori belief function bel 0 on O such that 
for all x ___ X: 
belx(xiO 1 u 02) = mo(O1)belx(xiO 1) + mo(Oz)belx(xiOz) 
+ mo(O 1 U 02)(bx(xiO1)b(xi02) 
-b(@i O~)b(OE 02)) 
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(see section 5.1.). A m 0 must be found that satisfies these constraints. This 
search will not always be successful in which case the DRC and the GBT 
do not apply. Failure reflects the fact that belx(.i0 ~ u 02) is based on 
more information than the one represented by belx(.i01), belx(.i02) and 
some bel 0. Difficulties can also appear when there are several solutions m 0 
that satisfy the constraints. We will not discuss them further here as, 
fortunately, in typical cases, belx(.i0) is known for the singletons 0 of 19 
(or for subsets 0 of 19 that constitutes a partition of 19). Then both the 
DRC and the GBT apply. 
5.6. 
When one has an a priori belief function belx0 on X, one could 
compute 
bel~i = belx(-i Oi) C)belx0 
for each Oi, i.e., our belief over X that combines both pieces of evidence, 
the one related to the 0 i and the one related to the prior on X. But it is 
erroneous to use the bel~v i in the GBT directly. Indeed, bel~,/ and bel~j, 
i ~ j, do not result from distinct pieces of evidence as they share the same 
a priori belx0. The correct computation consists in isolating each belx(. I0i), 
ballooning them on Xx®, @-combining them and marginalizing them on 
X and then C)-combining the result with belx0. Through this technique, 
each piece of evidence is taken into consideration once and only once. 
5.7. Discounting a Belief Function 
Consider an evidence that induces a normalized belief function bela on 
~. When the evidence as a whole is itself affected by some uncertainty 
(unreliability), Shafer [1, p. 251 et seq.] suggested "discounting" belo in 
order to take this new uncertainty into account. Let 1 - a be the degree 
of trust (reliability) in the evidence as a whole, where 0 < o~ < 1. The 
discounted belief function bel~ on 1) is defined by Sharer [1, p. 251] such 
that: 
VA ___ ~q, A 4~ 1~, bel~(A) = (1 - c~)beln(A) 
and bel~(l~) = bela(l~) = 1 
Shafer considers this concept of discounting as simple and useful but did 
not explain the origin of bel~ within his theory. It can be explained using 
the same ideas as those that lead to the GBT. 
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Let ~ be a flame with two elements E and E, where E means "I know 
the evidence," and ffS means "I do not know the evidence." Assume that 
these are the only pieces of evidence available. By definition, the belief 
function bela(.]E) induced on l-I by E is bel a. The belief function 
bela(.lE) induced by E on fl is vacuous--not knowing an evidence leaves 
us in a state of total ignorance. Thus for each element in ~', one has a 
belief over 12: bela( . IE)= beln(.) and belg(.LE) is the vacuous belief 
function. I.emma 2 shows that beln(.IE or E) is vacuous as bel~(.lE) is 
vacuous (and this irrespective of the DRC). 
Let 1 - a be my degree of belief over ~ that E holds (i.e., my degree 
of belief that the source of the evidence E is reliable). So one has the bba 
over ~ with m~(E)  = 1 - a and m~,(~) = a. 
Let bel~ be the belief induced on 11 by the conditional belief functions 
beln(.lE), beln(.lE) and bell~(.lE or E), and the prior bba m~ on ~. The 
application of (5.1) leads to: 
bel~(A) = m~.(E)be l t~( . lE )  + mv(E)bela( . lE)  + mg.(~)be ln ( . lE  or E) 
= (1 - a)be ln(A)  VA c_ 12, A ~ fl 
=1  A=f l  
Hence belT~ = bel~. The relation is always true as it is derived from (5.1) 
which always holds and not from (5.2) which is derived from the GBT. The 
discounted belief function bel~ can thus be justified within the TBM. 
Informally, the discounted belief function bel~ results from the idea 
that I have a degree of belief (1 - a)  that E is a legitimate (reliable) piece 
of evidence, in which case my belief on 12 is quantified by bel n. The 
remaining bbm a is given to the fact that E might be but is not 
necessarily a legitimate piece of evidence, in which case my belief on 12 
can be quantified by any belief function, including beln. In such a state of 
ignorance, the principle of minimal commitment justifies the use of the 
vacuous belief function to quantify my belief on 1). bel~ results from the 
combination of the initial belief function bel n on iq and the belief built 
on ~. 
Discounting can also be seen as the result of the impact of a meta-belief 
over the set ~'  of belief functions on lq. It fits with a very special but 
important case of a general theory of meta-beliefs. 1 - a is the meta-bbm 
(the basic belief mass related to the recta-belief function) given to the 
particular element beln of the set ~'  of belief functions on 12. a is the 
meta-bbm given to ~q~ itself. The discounting operation corresponds to the 
collapse of the meta-beliefs over the set of belief functions on ~ into a 
belief function on fl. 
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6. BELIEF NETWORKS 
We now introduce some possible applications of the GBT and the DRC. 
All belief functions considered here are induced by distinct pieces of 
evidence. 
Consider the simplest directed belief network with two nodes @ and X 
representing binary variables. The weights on the edge are the conditional 
plausibility functions on X given 0 and 0. 
@ 'X  
pl(xi0) pl(~i0) pl(x u210)  
pl(xE0) pl(~]0) p l (xu2 i0 )  
Forward propagation: 
Assume there is some basic belief masses on @: m(0), m(0) and 
m(0 u 0). Then we can compute the plausibility induced on X by equa- 
tion 5.4: 
pl(x) = m(O)pl(xiO) + m(0)pl (x i0)  
+ m(O u 0)(1 - (1 - pl(xi0))(1 - pl(xi0))) 
pl(~) = m(O)pl(Y, iO) + m(0)pl (~i0)  
+ m(O U 0)(1 - (1 - pl(~i0))(1 - pl($i0))) 
pl(x U $) = m(O)pl(x U SE0) + m(0)p l (x  U ~!0) 
+ m(O U 0)(1 - (1 - pl(x U $i0))(1 - pl(x U ~i0))) 
Backward propagation: 
Should we receive a plausibility on X instead, we could compute the 
belief on @ by equation (3.3) 
pl(0) = m(x)pl(xiO) + m(~)pl(~:i0) + m(x U .~)pl(x U ~i0) 
pl(0) = m(x)pl(xiO) + m(ff)pl(~!0) + m(x u 2)pl(x u ~!0) 
pl(0 U 0) = m(x)(1 - (1 - pl(xi0))(1 - pl(xi0)) 
+ m(.~)(1 - (1 - pl(.~iO))(1 - pl(~iO))) 
+ m(x U ~:)(1 - (1 - pl(x U.~iO))(1 - pl(x U.~iO))) 
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Propagation in both directions: 
Should one receive both a belief bel o on ® and a belief bel x on X, 
then 
for the X node: apply forward propagation using bel o and the conditional 
plausibilities and C)-combine the result with bel x. 
for the 0 node: apply backward propagation using bel x and the condi- 
tional plausibilities and C)-combine the result with bel o. 
Notice the strong symmetry between the above two sets of formula; it 
reflects the fact that unnormalized conditional plausibilities are symmetri- 
cal in their two arguments. Computing the corresponding belief function is 
immediate. Computing the corresponding basic belief masses or the com- 
monality function should be done with the Fast Moebius Transform 
(Kennes and Smets [33]) to optimize computation time. 
For more complicated acyclic belief networks, the computation is simi- 
lar. Each node stores the beliefs induced by its immediate neighbors. Once 
a node X indicates that its belief has changed, it propagates its new belief 
to all its neighbors. Each neighbor updates the belief induced by X by 
(~)-combine with its stored beliefs, using commonality functions for effi- 
ciency reasons. They then propagate the updated belief to Y's neighbors 
that have not yet been updated. This propagation is in fact identical to the 
one encountered in Sharer, Shenoy, and Mellouli's algorithm (Sharer et al. 
[4]). The advantage of our method is that storage on the edge is smaller (at 
most 11912 Ixl values) and propagation between odes is accelerated. The 
only weakness of our method is that it does not cover all possible belief 
functions between two variables; it is restricted to those belief functions 
that can be represented through the set of conditional belief functions, 
thus a subset of the set of all belief functions. We believe that this loss of 
generality is not serious, as far as most natural cases correspond to those 
where only the conditional belief functions are received. Finally, our 
computation is faster and requires less memory than the Shafer-Shenoy- 
Mellouli algorithm. 
7. EXAMPLE 
In order to illustrate the use of the GBT and the DRC, we consider an 
example of a medical diagnosis process. Let O = {01, 02, 0o~} be a set of 
diseases with three mutually exclusive and exhaustive diseases. 0a and 02 
are two "well-known" diseases, i.e., we have some beliefs on what symp- 
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toms could hold when 01 holds or when 02 holds. 0o, corresponds to the 
complement of {01, 0z} relative to all possible diseases. 0,o represents not 
only all the "other" diseases but also those not yet known. In such a 
context, our belief on the symptoms can only be vacuous. What do we 
know about the symptoms caused by a still unknown disease? Nothing of 
course, hence the vacuous belief function. 
We consider two sets X and Y of symptoms with X = {xl, x2, x 3} and 
Y = {Yl, Y2}- Tables 1 and 2 present he beliefs over X and Y when each 
of the individual diseases holds. They also show the beliefs over the 
symptoms when we only know that either 0~ or 02 holds. They are derived 
from theorem 3. The beliefs translate ssentially the facts that 01 "causes" 
(supports) x3 and Y2, and 02 "causes" xl or x 2 (without preference) and 
Yl. When we only know that 01 or 02 holds, then we have a balanced 
support over X, and some support in favor of Yr. 
Table 3 presents the beliefs induced on ® by the individual observation 
of symptom x 3 or of symptom y:, respectively. We assume that the 
symptoms are independent within each disease, hence the GBT can be 
applied. The independence assumption means that if we knew which 
disease holds the observation of one of the symptoms, it would not change 
our belief about the status of the other symptom. The right half of Table 3 
presents the beliefs induced on O by the joint observation of symptom x3 
and of symptom Y2. The beliefs are computed by the application of 
theorem 4. The symptoms individually and jointly support essentially 
{0~, 0,o}. The meaning of bel(0~ix3, Y2) -- 0.27 merits some consideration. 
It quantifies our belief that the joint symptoms x 3 and Y2 are not "caused" 
by 0~ nor by 02. It supports the fact that the joint observation is "caused" 
by another disease or by some still unknown disease. A large value for 
Table 1. Conditional beliefs (bel) and bbm (m) on the symptoms 
x _c X within each of the mutually exclusive and exhaustive diagnosis 
01, 02, and 0,o ~ O. The right part of the table present he 
beliefs (and bbm) on X given the disease is either 01 or 02. 
{01} {0 2} {0 w} {01, 0 2) 
X m bel m bel rn bel m bel 
{xO .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .00 .00 
{x 2} .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .00 .00 
{x 3} .5 .5 .2 .2 .0 .0 .10 .10 
{Xl, X2} .2 .2 .6 .6 .0 .0 .12 .12 
{x l, x 3} .0 .5 .1 .3 .0 .0 .05 .15 
{x2, x 3} .0 .5 .1 .3 ,0 .0 .05 .15 
{xl, x2, x 3} .3 1.0 .0 1.0 1.0 1.0 .68 1.00 
28 Philippe Smets 
Table 2. Conditional beliefs (bel) and bbm (m) on the symptoms 
y c_ Y within each of the mutually exclusive and exhaustive diagnosis 
01, 02, and 0~, ~ O. The right part of the table present he 
beliefs (and bbm) on Y given the disease is either 01 or 02. 
{81 } {8 2} {Sw} {81 , 8 2 } 
Y m bel m bel m bel m bel 
{Y0 .1 .1 .6 .6 .0 .0 .12 .12 
{Y2} .7 .7 .0 .0 .0 .0 .00 .00 
{Yl, Y2} .1 .9 .4 1.0 1.0 1.0 .88 1.00 
bel(0o~ix3,Y2) somehow supports the fact that we might be facing a new 
disease. In any case it should induce us in looking for other potential 
causes to explain the observations. 
Table 4 presents the beliefs induced on {01, 02} when we condition our 
beliefs on ® on {01, 02} , or when we have some a priori belief on 19. The 
results are obtained by the application of the conjunctive rule of combina- 
tion applied to the a priori belief on 19 and the belief induced by the joint 
observations. The belief functions presented are normalized. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
We have presented the GBT and the DRC built on the knowledge of a 
set of conditional belief functions belx(.]0) on X for each 0 in 19 where 
the O's constitute a partition of 19. Distinct beliefs on X and/or  19 can be 
Table 3. Left part: the basic belief masses (m) and the related 
commonality functions (q) induced on O by the observation of symptom 
x 3 or of symptom Y2. Right part: the basic belief masses (m) and 
the related belief function (bel), plausibility function (pl) and commonality 
function (q) induced on O by the joint observation of x 3 and Y2. 
iX3 iY2 !x3, Y2 
19 m q m q m q bel pl 
{8 0 .00 .80 .00 .80 ,00 .64 .00 .64 
{82} .00 .40 .00 .60 ,00 .24 .00 .24 
{8~} .12 1.00 .08 1.00 ,27 1.00 .27 1.00 
{8~,8 z} .00 .32 .00 .48 .00 .15 .00 .73 
{8~,0,o} .48 .80 .32 .80 .49 .64 .76 1.00 
{02,0 ~} .08 .40 .12 .60 .09 .24 .36 1.00 
{01, 02,0 J .32 .32 .48 .48 .15 .15 1.00 1.00 
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Table 4. The basic belief masses (m) and the related (normalized) 
belief function (beln) induced on 19 by the joint observation of 
x 3 and Y2, and based on three different a priori beliefs on 19: 
an a priori that rejects 0,o, a probabilistic a priori on 
{01, 0z}, and a simple support function on {01, 02}. 
m(01) = .3 m(01) = .3 
ix3, Y2 m(01, 02) = 1 m(02) = .7 m(01, 02) = .7 
® m be l ,  m bel,, m bel,~ 
{ } .30 .00 .70 .00 .32 
{01 } .54 .77 .19 .63 .57 .84 
{02 } .06 .09 .11 .37 .04 .06 
{0~,02} .10 1.00 .00 1.00 .07 1.00 
included. Beside the direct relevance of these theorems for inference and 
the combination of distinct disjunctive pieces of evidence, they are also 
useful when building belief networks: the assessment of conditional beliefs 
on X given each 0 is more natural and easier than the direct assessment 
of the joint belief on the space Xx®. The loss of generality does not 
appear to be of any practical importance. In any case, even for the general 
one, one can always speed up computation and reduce memory require- 
ments thanks to equations 5.1 and 5.3 that are always valid. Instead of 
storing the general belief function belxx o, store the set of conditional 
belief functions belx(.i0) V0 _ 19. The total amount of stored data is at 
most 2 IXl+l°F instead of 2 Igll°l, a serious gain ~'nce IXI and 1191 become 
large. 
The appropriate use of the GBT and the DRC resolves many of the 
problems that were raised in Pearl [34] as supposedly counterexamples 
against the Dempster-Shafer theory (see Smets [35] for an in-depth 
re-analysis of these examples). 
One should take care not to apply the GBT and the DRC blindly. The 
generalized likelihood principle is not always satisfied; its applicability 
must be verified. As a counterexample, consider a set of urns with ten balls 
among which some (n) are white, the others black. Suppose there is an urn 
with six white balls (n = 6). Let bel(Win = 6) be your belief that the next 
ball extracted from that urn is white knowing there are six white balls. You 
are free to give any value to bel(Win = 6). Hacking's frequency principle 
(Hacking [36]) supports that bel(W[n = 6) should be 6/10. It provides a 
reference scale to quantify beliefs, but any monotonous transformation 
could be as good. Nevertheless bel(Win = 6) and bel(Win = 7) are re- 
lated: once bel(Win = 6) is given, bel(Win = 7) may not be smaller, (if 
you have the least amount of coherence). Only in the world of "Absurdia" 
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could one accept hat the knowledge of bel(Win = 6) does not induce any 
constraint on the value of bel(Win = 7). We accept--hopefully--that we 
are not living in Absurdia. Hence bel(Win = 6) and bel(Win = 7) are 
related by extra constraints, and these constraints must be incorporated 
into the model. Blindly applying the GBT in such a context without due 
regard to the constraints that exist between the conditional belief func- 
tions would lead to erroneous answers. 
APPENDIX 
LEMMA 3: I fp lx (X lZ) /p l r (y lz )  = p lx (x ) /p lv (y )  Vx, y _ X, Vz _ Z, 
then plx(xl z) = p lx(x)p lz(z) .  
Proof By hypothesis, p lx (x j z ) /p lx (x )  = p lv(y lz ) /p l r (y ) .  So these ra- 
tios do not depend on x (nor on y). Let the ratio be equal to f(z). Hence 
plx(x lz)  = plx(x) f(z). As plx(x lz)  = plxxz(X n z) = plz(z!x), then f(z) 
= plz(z). QED 
LEMMA 4: Let X and Y be two frames of discernment. Let pl x and pl v be 
plausibility functions over the frames of discernment X and Y, respectively. 
Let plxx v be the plausibility function on XxY such that: plxxv(X ~ y) = 
plx(x)plv(y) .  Then 
and 
be lx(x ly)  = be lx (x )p lv (y )  
belx(Xl ly)  belx(Xl) 
belx(x21y) belx(x2) 
Proof 
Vx __X, Vy _c Y. 
Vx], x 2 c_ X, Vy __C_ Y. 
One has: 
p l r (y ) (p lx (X  ) - plx(£)) p lxxr (X  ~ y) - plxxr(.~ • y) 
p i t (y )  = = 
p lx(X ) - plx(.~ ) belx(x) 
p lx (X iy )  - plx(.~iy ) belx(x ly)  
= 
belx(x) belx(x) 
what proves the first equality. The second is then immediate. QED 
Proof of Theorem 1: 
Let X and Y be two finite spaces. Let {belx(.lOi) , 0 i ~ O} and {belr(.lOi), 
0 i ~ 0}, be two sets of normalized belief functions on X and Y, respec- 
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tively. Let pl(0ix), q(Oix) and pl(0iy), q(Oiy) be the plausibility and com- 
rnonality functions induced on 19 by the two distinct pieces of evidence 
x _c X and y _c Y. Requirement R1 is: 
q(Oix, y) = q(Oix).q(Oiy). VO c_ 0 (A.1) 
It becomes by lemma 1: 
E ( 1)10'1+1 , [ - p l (0  !x ,y )  = 
0'c_0 t 
Y'. ( - 1)10'1 +lpl(0'!x)] 
0'_c0 
"[ ~(-1)l°' l+lpl(O'iy) ] o ' c o  (A.2) 
We analyze successively the cases 10l = 1, 2 and n. 
1. When 101 = 1, equation A.2 becomes: pl(0Ex, y) = pl(O]x)pl(Oiy) or 
equivalently 
plxxv(x A yiO) = plx(xiO)plv(yiO) (A.3) 
So x and y are CCI (see Section 2.3). 
2. Assume 0= 01 U 02 with 01 , 02~19, 01 ~ 02. For i=1 ,2 ,  let 
ai = p lx (x iO i ) ,  "Yi = Plr(ylO), -~i = plx(Y ' iO i ) ,  ~li = Plr(yI0i), fi = plxxr(X 
O~iOi). By A.3, plxxv(X nyiO 1) = cfl71 and plx~v(x nyiO 2) = OtET 2. By 
the generalized likelihood principle, there exists a g function such that 
plx(xiO) =g(a l ,~ l ,~2,a2)  and Plr(yi0) =g(Yl,71,72,~/2) 
Equation A.2 becomes: 
O/1")/1 "~ /9/2')/2 -- g(alyl , fa , a272,f2) 
= (al  + a2 - g(al,-if1, a2, a2))" (71 + 72 - g(71,~/1, TZ,T2)) 
(A.4) 
Let plx(.10 I) be vacuous. Hence a 1 = al = 1 and fl = 1 as fl  = plxxv(X 
oY~i01) >- plx(Y, i01) = 1. One has also g(1, 1, a 2, ~2) = 1 as plx(xiO) > 
plx(xiO 1) = 1. 
Equation A.4 becomes: 
"~1 = O'2"Y2 -g (Y l ,  1, f f2"Y2,f2 ) = Ot2('~l -'F ~2 - -g (T1 ,71 ,Y2 ,T2)  
So g does not depend on its second parameter. Identically g does not 
depend on its fourth parameter. 
Let: k( a, 7) = g( oz,., 7,.). 
One has pl(01 u Ozix) = k(pl(Ollx), pl(0ziX)), or identically, plx(xiO 1 u 
02) =k(plx(xiO1),plx(xiO2)). Let plx(xiO 1) = 1. As plx(xiO 1 0 02) > 
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plx(xiO 1) by lemma 2, then k(1, 3') = 1 = k(y, 1) as k is symmetrical in its 
arguments. 
Let a I = 3/2 = 1. Then equation A.4 becomes: 
Yl + a2 - k(Yl ,  a2) = (1 - a 2 - 1).(71 + 1 - 1)) 
hence, 
and 
k(Yl, Or2)  = 71  + Or2 - -  a2Y l  = ] - -  (1 - 71)(1 - a 2 )  
plx(xiO) = k(a l ,  t~2)  = 1 - (1 - a l ) (1  - o~ 2)  
= 1 - (1 - plx(xE01)).(1 - plx(xi02)) 
3. By iteration one gets plx(xiO). Assume 0 = O ~'=10i where 0 i n Oj = 
O Vi 4: j. Assume 
n 
plx(xiO) = 1 - I - I  (1 - plx(xiOi)) = 1 - ]--I (1 - tri). 
Oi~ 0 i= 1 
Consider part 2 of the proof, but replace 01 by 0 and 02 by On + 1" The 
proof  can proceed as in 2: 
plx(x!O u On+ 1) = plx(x!O) + plx(x!O,+ 1) 
- plx(xiO)plx(xiO,+~) 
= 1 - I - I  (1 - plx(xiO,)) (A.5) 
Oi ~ OU On+ 1 
The relation for belx(x!O) and mx(xiO) are deduced from A.5. The 
results are normalized. QED 
Proof of Theorem 2: 
Derive directly from p l (0 !x )= p lx (x i0 )  and be l (0 ix )= p l (O ix ) -  
pl(0 !x ) and normalize by dividing by bel(@ix ). QED 
Proof of Theorem 3: 
mx(QiO i) (and/or  mv(;~!Oi)) might be non-null. To see the impact of 
such non-null basic belief masses, enlarge the X space into X' where 
X' = X to to and X N to = Q. Apply the same proof  as for theorem 1 with 
normalized belief functions on X' and condition all results on X. As such 
conditioning is idempotent,  one can apply it at the level of  Plx(. i0) or at 
the level of each plx(. ! Oi). For all x ___ X, the plausibilities before and after 
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conditioning are the same. So the generalized likelihood principle still 
applies for all x _c X. But after the conditioning has been applied, the 
functions plx(. I 0 i) are un-normalized plausibility functions. QED 
Proof of Theorem 4: 
Derive directly from pl(01x)= plx(x!O) 
pl(Oix). 
and bel(O[x) = pl(Oix) - 
QED 
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